Sceptics. - I fear that women who have grown old are more sceptical in the secret recesses of their hearts than any of the men; they believe in the superficiality of existence as in its essence, and all virtue and profundity is to them only the disguising of this "truth" is the very desirable disguising of a pudendum, - an affair, therefore, of decency and modesty, and nothing more!
The Gay Science, 64
The puzzle of woman as the puzzle of the truth
Guess for me what this word is hiding:
"A woman invents things while a man discovers -"
The Wanderer and His Shadow
Strange is Nietzsche's fascination with the female. Even stranger is the kinship between the female and the will to power, which is present in Nietzsches late philosophy. Strange and somewhat "queer". This kinship is strange because, in the most important interpretations of Nietzsches philosophy, the will to power is considered its basic idea, and the woman only a more or less peripheral motif, often passed over in interpretations. And it is "queer" because, by revealing the "female" contents of this "masculine" term, it throws an unusual light on our philosopher. Now it proves possible to bring a different interpretation to this notorious misogynist, who is still ill reputed thanks to his familiar verbal outflow of "machismo" as well as his uncompromising criticism of feminism.
It proves that the male-female opposition which appears in Nietzsches writing must not be interpreted in only one way. The ambivalence of his position on woman and the female points to the fact that they themselves are problematic, it tells us of their mysteriousness. In any case, when Nietzsche speaks of the relationship between the female and the male and when, albeit indirectly, he links the motif of woman to the motif of the will to power, a degree of irony, of parody is present. Linking two opposed terms, twisting their meaning and bringing together what cannot be brought together, Nietzsche is trying to break away from the old lexical collocations and oppositions such as "male and female" or "truth and semblance". In this way he attempts to make possible the expression of a different, non-dogmatic way of thinking, thus breaking away from the logic of identity. Speaking of female nature, the female per se or the eternal female, he would be no different from dogmatic feminists, similarly, in his discourse on philosophy which should finally become male, he would go no further than dogmatic philosophers, helpless, the helpless, futile men who have characterised all philosophy until now.
The link between Nietzsches "male teaching", reserved for manly spirits only, those courageous enough to be able to discover the horrifying truth that the philosophy of the will to power teaches and the female wisdom of mysteriousness and the insubstantial nature of every truth, its "Dionysian dowry" is, itself, mysterious. And now the puzzle of the female places a new puzzle in front of us the puzzle of truth. The truth, as all of philosophy, dogmatic, has understood it to date is no longer something beyond question, it appears as problematic. Now the truthfulness of every truth is being called into question, even perhaps of the truth which Nietzsches philosophy aims at. All truth now moves into the realm of the female, as a lie, fabrication, an illusion of perspective. It proves that the truth, like woman, wont allow itself to be discovered. And that the dream of discovery (of the truth or of woman) is nothing but the mere dream of a failed, unsuccessful man, such as only a dogmatic philosopher can be.
We shall attempt to solve the puzzle placed before us by Nietzsches statements on woman and the truth in the light of two of his self-definitions. He described himself as being a psychologist of "the eternal female" as well as the founder of the psychology which would be the queen of sciences, psychology as teaching of the will to power. And to show what it is which links the female and the will to power, as subjects of psychology.
Nietzsches teaching on the will to power is teaching on an interpretation of perspective and on the illusion at the heart of things. It brings both a different understanding of reality and a different understanding of cognition, which should open up for philosophy a path to its non-dogmatic form. The motif of female in his late philosophy is what deconstructs the understanding of the relationship between truth and reality as well as the ideas which are its basic presumptions. It emerges that the female is just another name for the perspectivity of the will for power, a metaphor for life and its power for deception. So the story about the female become a story about the will for power, about life which evaluates, about the evaluation which forms the basis for all our truths and all our ethics, all our depths and virtues. And, in this way, the story continues, in the story about a body which evaluates and exists. And it shows how dogmatic stories about the relationship between the soul and the body lose their importance in the light of insight into the "femaleness" of the will to power. However it also demonstrates that Nietzsches categories of the body and reality as the will to power must no longer be understood dogmatically as some new, unconditional thing, as some new truth.
1. The relationship between woman and the truth
From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant and hostile to woman than truth - her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.
Beyond Good and Evil, 232.
Nietzsches perspectivism is aimed directly against the dogmatic love for the truth, against the dogma-like fate in the cognition of being. This becomes clear if we understand it as teaching on the illusion of our every pretence to cognition, whether this be called science or metaphysics. The consequence of such cognitive, theoretical pessimism is the thesis on the non-existence of some world of beings or, in other words, of a true world, a world of the truth which would be the object of cognition. This means that there is no world by itself which a spirit could discover, trying to push its way through appearance, trying to break through to the other side of that deceit which is the product of the body and the senses.
Nietzsche not only sees the truth understood in this way as a problem, he also reveals its moral origin. Beginning with the fact the prevailing morality sees the greatest virtue in love for the truth, he reveals the link between the love for the truth, its faith in the being and in the moral, seeing it as a symptom of a certain evaluation which denies life. And, along with faith in the truth, he also calls into question the faith in the morality which has ruled for two thousand years. Thus it is not surprising that that two basic presumptions of dogmatism are studied as inseparable: faith in the spirit in itself and in the good in itself, which began with Plato, are the two basic delusions on which the dogmatic love for the truth is based. And there is no spirit in itself, separate from the body, from sensuality and passion, which would be an organ of some truth by itself, generally adopted and inevitable, just as there is no good by itself, common to all, which may be discovered by the pure, cool voice of reason. Faith in the spirit in itself and the in good in itself are only delusions, merely basic lies without which faith in the truth, misunderstandings of the body, symptoms of its illness would not be possible.
One different understanding is in confrontation with Nietzsches dogmatic understanding of the truth, because for all earlier philosophy, which is, according to Nietzsche, a dogmatic theory, the truth is a synonym for the cognition of the being, it is the same thing as the being. Such faith in the truth implies belief in the existence of some true world of beings which the spirit can and must reveal. Unlike the dogmatic philosophers, Nietzsche identified the truth with woman and in an entirely different way. Because the dogmatic philosophers also identify woman with truth, but in such a clumsy way that the woman-truth slips away from them. And, in our philosophers opinion, they dont know much about woman or about truth.
The dogmatic philosophers believe in truth for itself, in some ideal world, in some true world, just as they believe in woman in herself in their idealistic misapprehensions. They believe that it is possible to go beyond appearance, that the truth can be discovered, they believe that truth is more important than appearance. This is exactly what their clumsiness consists of. The reason the truth will not reveal itself to them lies exactly in their strong desire to discover it. The desire to discover and unveil is typical of metaphysicians and scientists. This phantasm of theirs on the naked goddess of science was noted by Nietzsche back in The Birth of Tragedy and even back then he notes that at issue is a mere phantasm, mere self-deception, a fundamental self-delusion of the science which establishes it as science. Because veils can never be fully lifted when one veil is lifted a new one appears: the truth, i.e. the truth-woman, is a veil itself, composed of veils.
The secret of the man of science, or of the futile man, lies exactly in this discovery. And the secret of the woman-truth is the fact that there is no truth, there is no bottom to the abyss of the being which the scientist would like to reach guided by a "line a causality cable". At the same time this is also the secret of every truth, the secret which discovers itself only to Nietzsche, as a friend of women (and as the new friend of truth).
Nietzsches understanding of the woman-truth may be reconstructed from a number of aphorisms on women and their attitude to truth. He equates truth with woman and woman the abyss, with a bottomless abyss. And he identifies woman with the superficial power of art, with the enjoyment of ones self in pretending, in which every essence is lost, every nature, every being, every character, and which characterises actors, actresses, hysterics, hysterical women and women in general. And, as such, he sees it as the female artist of lies, of illusion and beauty, as opposed to male seriousness and depth of truth. And, in the eyes of our friend of women, the reason for womens hostility to truth lies in female shame.
But does this not mean that Nietzsches woman-truth does, after all, hide something of which she is ashamed, some ugly truth? And how is this possible, when her truthfulness is exactly contained in her appearance, behind which there is no being, no last truth, when her depth consists precisely of her superficiality and the whole of her truth is in her veil? These questions point exactly to the constituent contradictions in Nietzsches understanding of the truth as a woman and of woman as the truth. And, bearing in mind that Nietzsche has ascribed the transformational power of seduction to life itself as well, then the relationship between the truth according to which woman-truth is the truth , and the ugly truth that she hides behind her truth as true dissemblance, becomes clear. In other words he has identified woman with life, he sees her as the power of talking into life, which is inseparable from life itself.
If woman is identified with life, she becomes another name for the fallacious principle at the very heart of things, for the process of lying which has no end, and that is life itself. Woman then becomes what the perspectivist science of our philosopher is talking about. Then she is nothing but superficial power, the enjoyment in pretending which is typical of everything which exists, and not only of art, acting and hysteria. Life itself is woman and woman is a synonym for that false character of life. In the event that she is truth, woman is the symbol of the will for removing that false character of things from before ones eyes. And, as such, she is the same as life. Woman is a seduction into the existence of the truth, a seduction into life. Thus she is the same as the power of appearance, the same thing as the perspectivist principle, inseparable from reality, the one who makes life possible.
Nietzsches perspectivism derives the will to truth from the will to deceit and it is here that our whole concept of reality and truth is seen as an illusion, but one which is inseparable from reality. This means that in order to survive we incorporate the postulates of our logic into the reality of existence and flow, postulates which are not only the basic assumptions of our thinking, but the basis of our survival. As such these are no criteria for the truth but imperatives for what should be considered truth, instructions in line with which we are just beginning to create the true and the false imposed on us by our self-preservation. Similarly, in this world based on lies, cognition is impossible, however, on the other hand, the species of animal, man, would not be able to exist without the belief that cognition is possible. And that it is nothing but faith in the judgment which can guess the truth, the criterion for truth being the principle of contradiction according to which we cannot both confirm and deny the same thing in one thing.
However, from the aspect of the will for power as a matter of perspective, weve simply made such things up. Because the reality is contradictory and false, and it resists being turned into the imaginary world of truth. The only true reality is the ocean of life, the game of waves and the waves of forces, a whole of changeable, insubstantial centres of energy. In other words, the world is the will for power and nothing more. The perspectivist interpretation is found at the very heart of things: there are only centres of energy - the impetuses and needs of the organic, which interpret the world from their own point of view. They believe that their position is the only possible concept of reality and they want to force it on everything else.
The world is not a world of beings, the world does not have beings, there is nothing in it that is the same - it is a world of relationships, actions and reactions of each centre of energy to the whole. "Each centre of energy has its own view of the rest of the world that is, its very defined measure of value, its own way of functions, its own way of resistance. Therefore, The Illusory World boils down to a particular kind of action towards the world, setting out from one centre." Other centres of energy affect us and, in order for us to survive, to defend ourselves, to come to grips with them, we sort out the chaos of impressions which are the result of the worlds influence on us, by incorporating them into our values, the conditions for our survival. And in this way we create our own world, a world of beings which is nothing but an illusory world. Life itself, which is inseparable from its creating power of life-creating illusion, invents logical categories and axioms as means used by the animal species of man to adjust the world for the purpose of self-preservation, despite the fact that this illusory, logically-set reality is born, this reality of permanent empirical illusion which is the only reality for us "because we live in it, we can live in it: this is the proof of its truth for us "
However, despite all this, the dogmatic philosophers want to get rid of illusion and get to the truth, i.e. to the true world which, actually, doesnt exist. They have misinterpreted this direction of life itself, which seduces life itself into life, and they have proclaimed the "anthropocentric idiosyncrasy" of logic the criteria of truth and have turned the question of life into a question of the true world. In this way they reject this world of ours as illusory, the only world we can live in. And they fabricate some other world, on the other side, a world of beings which is unchangeable, non-disappearing and indestructible, proclaiming it the true world, the true reality. This way, seduced by anti-life morality, they reject life itself. Their will for truth, according to Nietzsche, is nothing but a concealed will for death. The very fact that they believe this world to be illusory and the world on the other side a true one, is a symptom, a symptom of a tired life, of its evaluation, its morality, according to which life is a sickness. This evaluation is one which discards passion, the arbitrariness and accidental quality of the irrational, changes. It dismisses the senses as deceitful and deceit as an obstacle on the path to learning true being.
This may best be seen in Platos example: reason, the clean spirit, is the only path to a being, unchangeable and stable, to the true world. And the emptiest ideas and the most general logical axioms are the criteria of this true world. This is an ideal world, a world which had the form of general terms in Platos works: these exist as being, they have not only cognitive, but also ontological sense. In the late stages of its development, this Platonic world of ideas becomes a world full of ideals of a decadent morality which have gained the dignity of beings and in which this life and this world are denied and true reality is ascribed to the divine, denatured world. In its later development, philosophy turns into ever more treacherous theology and becomes an obvious link between philosophy and a religion which denies life, which is latently present as early as in the work of Plato. In addition the hidden morality on which Platos ontology is based is exposed.
The entire history of philosophy as "the great school of slander" from the time of Plato to that of Nietzsche is marked by this connection between philosophy, morals and religion. And the foundation of this link is the instinct of decadence: this yields the "other world" which is "a synonym for non-being, non-life, the will for non-life " Thanks to this, the love of the truth has become the will to elimination of illusion and, as such, will to the other world and to rejecting this world, which leans on the illusion, "on error, deceit, dissimulation, delusion and self-delusion".
Behind the objectivity of the dogmatic philosophers, behind their belief in the "metaphysical value of the truth" in the truth as a being, behind their distancing from "every interpretation (from committing violence, from setting in order, from curtailing, omitting, filling in, inventing, forging and anything else which already belongs to the essence of each interpretation) 36] lies the incapability of creating, a lack of power which comes from the non-belief in life. And just as he believes in some world of beings, in the truth in itself which hides behind appearance and the deception of our senses, the dogmatic also believes in the woman in herself, believes that a being hides behind her veils and her dissimulation.
In this way he sees the truth as the woman, he believes in the woman-truth, he believes that he can conquer her by exposing her. This is his way of making truth out of the woman and the woman out of the truth. But by doing so he fails to allow the woman, seen by Nietzsche as life-creating, as a power of illusion which persuades into life, he fails to allow her to be a woman, just as he fails to allow the truth, seeing it as a being, to be the truth of this world. Because the eros of the dogmaticians, as the eros of the truth-lovers, does not induce to life but persuades to death.
At the very beginning of the history of philosophy, which Nietzsche saw as a history of misconception of the truth and the being, the truth seen and understood as true, real, Platos ideal world, is still accessible. As, as such, in Nietzsches opinion, is still a woman. She is within the reach of a wise man, of a philosopher full of virtues, moderate, courageous, wise and just. For only in such a man does the will follow the mind and the mind follow the will, only he is not disrupted by the passions and the will in the supreme task of learning what exists. "The true world, accessible to a wise man, devout, full of virtues he lives in it, he is that world."
The truth takes the image of woman and woman takes the image of the truth only in Christianity. Only with Christianity, with the Christian form of truth, does philosophical dogmatism, as love for truth and hatred for the living, take its final form. Dogmatism, as a dream of conquering the woman-truth, now becomes a dream of death because the woman-truth slips away from its hands in this life, illusory and immoral. Thus the truth "becomes a woman, it becomes a Christian woman," in the sense of being accessible, which is possible to discover, however, only in the other world. At lest this is how the dogmatic philosophers understand the truth. And woman. Woman is a handy synonym for the truth, for the true world which is beyond reach in this life but is promised in the form of life after death. Such a true world is divine, alienated from nature, while at the same time being a world of the highest moral values. These are unnatural values, removed from nature, commanded by the god of the ascetic priest the god who is an enemy of life. The truth, or the idea, which was a concept in Platos work, has been raised to the level of a being, has become a moral ideal of a powerless life with Christianity, a powerless life which has gained ontological dignity.
So the idealists, making the truth into something from the other side, out of reach in this life, a woman, turned woman herself into truth, a Christian, one from the other side, they create the woman-truth from their ideal, from the rib of their god. And in this way the woman-truth has gained the characteristics and the virtues of a powerless man from the other side, a truth-loving dogmatic philosopher who yearns for death: she then becomes "the truth which must not be run away from" . Thus the idealists will not let a woman be a woman, she is no longer that power of seducing to life, that woman-truth-life which Nietzsche teaches but, from the distance of the other side, she seduces to death. However she is still a woman, all the more since she does not reveal the secret of her own falsehood to the objective man, the dogmatic-idealist, the secret of her shameful origin in the interpretations and evaluations of a life which is declining. This secret is hidden behind the veil of dignity which the ruling morality has wrapped her in . The woman-truth-Christian has seduced all philosophy to date with the charms of this veil. She is ashamed because she fears losing her "power of enchantment". Because she is still a woman and, thanks to that, seductive to that of the other side, she does, after all, seduce to life - she keeps alive "many of those who are failures", "the kind of people not inclined towards life".
The woman-truth, as the truth of her shameful origin, as the truth of her own untruth, also includes the truth of the untruth of every truth. This is the truth of perspective as the assumption of everything we can call true, as well as of everything which exists: it carries within itself the truth "of the superficiality of existence as its essence". And, as such, it slips away from the dogmatic philosophers because they see the truth as more valuable than illusion, and also as something different from it, because the basic assumption of dogmatism is the denial of its truth of the untruth of every truth. The truth is woman enough, so she reveals herself to those like her. Thus she reveals herself only to those who do not speak the language of the dogmatically understood truth, or at least use it in an ironic way. She reveals herself only to her friends, those who speak her language, the language of illusion, untruth, seduction, the language which deceives by saying that some truth exists, without themselves believing in the truth, to those who speak the language of detouring from the truth.
She is artistic enough, so she despises objectivists of all kinds as futile and incapable of creating. She despises the scientists who would like to peer under her skin, under her dresses and jewellery, out of pure impotence, wanting to find there some ready-made given truth, because they are incapable of creating new truths. Even if she shows herself to them, her shame is fatal to those who see it. This leads to the suicide of science, to its end in nihilism, for which sciences love of truth has set the conditions: science finally gains insight into general mendacity and thus removes, by itself, the very foundation it stands on. Thus the woman-truth kills science: for something like this she is Christian enough, she is from the other side. But this is also a move by which she kills herself, but in her Christian form. And now we arrive at what Nietzsche had in mind when he said that woman begins to hate when she loses her power of enchantment. Nihilism means the breakdown of the values which have directed life for centuries, given sense to life: woman-truth, as the decadent philosophers, moralists and religious saw her, begins losing her power of persuading into life. And so her anti-life direction, given her by the dogmatic philosopher-theologians, surfaces. By exposing herself, she shows herself as the truth of the mendacity of all former depths and virtues, as the truth of the mendacity of everything which exists. At the same time, by so doing, she reveals the secret of the perniciousness of all truth, seen as revelation, as the abolition of illusion. As Nietzsche points out, illusion is a pre-requisite for life, regardless of what shape it may take.
Revealed, she is the last and the fulfilled form of truth, the anti-life truth from the other side: once she realises that her foundation is delusion, she kills not only those who serve her, but herself as well. As the truth of the untruth of each truth, she pulls the rug from under herself, she cancels her own self as the truth, at least in the sense of a dogmatically understood truth. Such cancellation then opens up new possibilities and new forms of truth. Because, by cancelling her own self as the dogmatic truth, the woman-truth does not cease to be a woman, does not stop persuading into life, does not stop presenting illusion as illusion. This conclusion is inevitable if we refuse to accept that Nietzsches perspectivism, as the "truth" about the untruth of all truth, is still truth in the dogmatic sense.
This self-revelation of the woman-truth has a different effect when she reveals herself to those she loves, and they are not objectivists; her friends are friends of the illusion, friends of the female in the truth. They dont see her as some identity which should be stormed, as someone who needs to be exposed, rather they see her as an ironic combination of the thing in itself and the abyss, the eternal female and the abyss. They see her as an actress, as a figure of enjoyment of illusion, as the concealment of the natural, as praise for the semblance, for the artificial, for tailors, as the embodiment of "divinely artificial" art, as an artistic illusion, which lies behind every truth.
Nietzsche arrives at this "truth" of woman-truth; in his philosophy he deals with the revelation of the truth, the removal of the veil happens, and after this the truth no longer remains the truth. Before him (and in him) the woman-truth-Christian, the truth as seen by the philosophical theologians, removes the veil of dignity and reveals herself to him as an ugly old woman, the ugliest of all old women. However, this "truth" which Nietzsche discovers, and which reveals itself only to him, can no longer be the truth in the old sense of the word, the truth without quotation marks. He certainly isnt the truth-loving old type, but wants to pave the way for the new friends of the truth.
What slips away from the dogmatist is insight into pudento origo and when, in the end, he finally reaches it, this truth kills him. Because there, in his truth-loving, he still speaks of the truth and not of the "truth". For the woman does not fully reveal her secret, she does not revel that the illusion is life-giving, she does not inform them that illusion is not a reason for rejecting life but a way to maintain life and extol it. The woman-truth reveals herself only to Nietzsche in a process which begins with Plato and ends with Nietzsche and in which truth becomes fallacy. Before Nietzsche there appears an ugly old woman as the truth of the woman-Christian, as its last truth, in the form of scepticism. The last form of truth is the sceptics doubt in whether all the truths to that point have really been truths and which, in this way, preserves the faith in truth. However he falls into the category of those who have become disgusted by the truth. After all, he does not intend to discover anything, he is one of those who have already seen too much, thus become "far too experienced, too serious too deep" to speak, once again about some discovery; he is one of those who respects the womans distance and shame. And exactly because of this his artistic philosophy no longer wants the truth, but only the "truth". The conjunction of art and philosophy, which the philosophy of the future is to be based on, is what should be giving new forms to the woman-truth. Only in those future forms will she become a woman in the true sense of the word, the justification for life, the persuasion for life.
Revealing itself to Nietzsche is the "truth" of the truth, at the end of the process in which it becomes an illusion, a process which is a parody of Hegels dialectic process of the truth, at the twilight of one "epoch", in the light of the evening glow, in the light of the twilight in which all our truths cave in as illusions, through the camera obscura of Nietzsches artistic perspective. For now the very difference between the illusory and the true world has been done away with, the will to power is not reality in the old sense and Nietzsches philosophy is not truth in the old sense, or even his "truth" about the truth. This is not where the woman-truth is fully revealed, the image of the old woman-Christian is not her final image. And how could that even be possible when she is bottomless, this is where the alliance between our philosopher and the female principle is formed, as the principle of the falseness of all principles, as the secret of the non-essentiality of all essences. And now begins a turnabout in which all those powers of falseness, encompassed in the figure of the woman-truth as life, are released.
2. The relationship between the body and the spirit: body as a metaphor
Behind the highest judgments on the values which have led the history of thought so far, lie hidden misunderstandings of the nature of the body We may see all those courageous follies of metaphysics individually, its answers to the question of the value of the being, always and primarily as symptoms of certain bodies... as the body's slowing down, tiredness, impoverishment, its presentiment of the end, its will to an end.
The Gay Science, Preface to the second edition, 2.
As we have seen, the woman is the name for the untruth of the truth, for the secret of all our baseness and virtues, for the secret of everything we have seen as true and moral. This secret eludes the praiseworthy, truth-loving dogmatists and, as we have seen, reveals herself only to those who speak her language. Woman - that is the name for the secret of the superficiality and fallacy of everything which exists, of the will to power as the power of the false. Woman, which is a metaphor for deep insight into perspective, which dissolves everything we see as the truth and which affects all our attempts to ascertain the truth as well as affecting our sense of reality, what we call reality and truth. This insight into perspective, which dissolves all our truth, is insight into the evaluation which is the basis of all our truth, insight into the life which evaluates, into the evaluating will to power, into the interpretation of our passions and instincts.
This is insight into the shameful origin of things, this is Nietzsches "knowledge of pudenda origo". And, in the light of the will to power, all our truth and all our values appear linked, inseparable. This is an insight into the immorality of our values, whether it be our love for the truth or our moral laws which compel us to this love for the truth. So far, their origin has been carefully concealed: they are the will to power, and nothing else, they are as the interpretation of life itself, the immorality which characterises life itself. In Nietzsche, the will to truth becomes aware of itself as a problem, and, along with the will to truth, so does the moral. Altruistic, ascetic values, which are the very foundation of our concept of the truth and our values, and which mean distancing oneself from ones personal interpretations and evaluations, from personal conditions of survival, are shown as "a very careful covering-up of something shameful," as an interpretation of the will to power of a life which has fallen ill. As such, they are still the will to power, which is something quite the opposite of restraint, "restraint from mutual harm" and the opposition of "levelling ones will with that of another".
The will to power is something we should give up according to the demands of the basic values pronounced by both our truths and our tables of laws. However this denying of the will to power is the will to power of one life in decline, which strives for nothingness and denies life itself. This is a resentful, vindictive interpretation which would like to deny life, the basic assumptions of life and its ascent. This is the will to denying life because "basically life itself is the possessing, hurting, taking over of what is alien and weaker, incorporation, and, at the very least, exploitation. This is an envious will against everything extraordinary, against the strong, the independent, against everything which personifies the highest possibilities of life. This way it is against the basic instincts of life for, as the will to power, life always strives towards self-overtaking, ascent, creation above one's self.
The will to truth, to an objective cognition, now appears as a skill of interpretation, just like the moralist's will to objective norms. This will, wrapped in a veil of dignity, appears as an interpretation of a man incapable of creating, incapable of incorporating his will into things, as an interpretation of a faceless man-mirror. Both the truth-lovers and the moralists believe in some "world as it should be", which is why they are incapable of creating. As Nietzsche notes: "they believe that it already exists, they look for ways and means of reaching it. 'The will to truth' as the impotence of the will to creation". The will to objectivity shows itself as impotence, disguised in objective observation, which seeks that the truth be the truth for everyone and which thus rejects perspective and, along with it, life itself.
With his idea of perspectivism, Nietzsche stands up to both the will to truth and its faith in the generality and necessity of the truth, as well as to the moral will for the general and necessary values. What he sees here is only an interpretation, an interpretation of a certain kind of life, against a different kind of life, he sees there a certain skill of interpretation which is accompanied by the force of interpretation. He sees there the evaluation of the instincts of decadence, "the revenge of the exhausted and of the rabble," supported by immoral means, he also sees the instinct of the herd, which wishes to secure itself against the dangers coming from the rare and the successful man species. Banding together against this danger are "the weakness of the animal from the herd and the weakness of the decadents". And the means they employ are, as Nietzsche notes, the most immoral, and absolutely the most immoral of all is the metaphysical slander of life, which is exposed by the evaluation of the ascetic priest.
Our unconditional will to truth, i.e. our faith in the generality and the necessity of truth, is nothing but faith in the ascetic ideal which depersonalises; its basic assumption is depersonalisation which the ascetic priest prescribes "as medicine against physiological exhaustion". And the immorality of the priest consists exactly of his still remaining within the will to power by turning against the will to power and against life itself. However this priestly will to power is not the will to power of those whom Nietzsche calls refined, but the will to power of a life in decline, which continues to be the will to power. "... What rules here is resentment which has no equal, the resentment of the unsatisfied instinct and will to power, the will which would want to become the master not only of something within life, but the master of life itself, its deepest, strongest and most basic assumptions: this is where physiological progress is regarded with acerbity and malice, particularly its expression - beauty and happiness: on the other hand this is where satisfaction is felt and sought in failure, stunted growth, pain misery, ugliness, wilful loss, self-deadening, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice.
The ascetic priest does not choose the means in this fight against the highest appearances of life. This appears based on the origin of the ascetic ideal in the will to power. The origin of the ascetic ideal which rules philosophy and science is seen by Nietzsche "in the protective instinct of the declining life which tries to survive and fights for its existence by every means possible" and which, by using every means possible, tries to keep alive "the whole herd of the failed, irritated, underprivileged, miserable and all those who suffer". And the ascetic priest places himself at the head of that herd and leads it against the "well-developed and victorious", turns around their virtue, denies the conditions of their survival and proclaims the herds conditions of life a virtue, a moral which should apply to all.
The universality and the necessity of moral values as "the will of the ill to represent any form of superiority", as "their instinct for secret paths which lead to tyranny through the healthy," is nothing but the will to power of the weakest. As such it is the work of the ascetic priest. And, just like faith in the truth, as faith in the absolute value of the truth, as faith in the belief that truth is more valuable than illusion and that it must not be doubted, regardless of how highly a philosopher or a scientist may value their suspicion and lack of naivety.
And Nietzsche calls into question this will to truth, this "trueness" which all philosophers have spoken about until his time. He sets the value of the truth and develops it by examining and destroying the basic terms linked with the idea of the truth: the idea of the spirit (conflicting with the senses, instincts, passions, body, will), and the idea of the being, God. He discovers the ascetic presumptions in these terms we believed to be clean and unconditional, he discovers asceticism in philosophical terms of the "clear mind" and "absolute spirituality" and "cognition in itself". These terms represent the denial of everything which "is felt as true, as real, with utmost certainty," of everything which "the real life instinct most unconditionally sets the truth in". The idea of the spirit is an ascetic relinquishing of inventing, forging, of every interpretation. This relinquishing reveals both asceticism of virtue, which consists of relinquishing ones own virtue and ones own truth, the creation of ones own values and the relinquishing of creating violence, as well as the rejection of sensuality and corporeity, typical of asceticism. The idea of the spirit is a creation of the ascetic will which wants to deny perspective and corporeity and, thus, the mundane life based on corporeity and perspective.
Nietzsche shows how the ascetic ideal is the dogmatic philosophers presumption, his form of appearance. And dogmatic philosophy shows itself as a perfidious theology, that is to say based on lies: one of its two basic delusions, the delusion of the existence of a pure spirit, is nothing but an outright lie. Seduced by the truth made by the woman and the Christian, lured into other-sidedness, into nothingness, seduced by their own fallacy, appearing to Nietzsche as a product of their diseased yearning for peace and the end of suffering, the dogmatists believe in the spirit as the organ of truth and in the body as the immoral cause of fallacy. This is how the secret eludes them, the secret that the "truth" carries within itself, the secret of the unreality of the spirit, of its corporeity, the secret of the corporeity of every truth and of the insubstantiality of every body. And by exposing trust in the mind as a moral phenomenon, our philosopher discovers its origin in insanity.
Spirit, soul, "I", thought (which Nietzsche links with the term mind, with no strict terminological definition), is no higher or nobler than the body; moreover, now the distinction between the soul and the body is being erased. He fights against the "atomism of the soul" against the concept which sees the soul as one, one of a kind, identical; however this does not mean that he also wants to get rid of the concept of the soul. Thus Nietzsche keeps the hypothesis of the soul, but in a particular manner which eradicates the distinction between the soul and the body. He brings into the game terms such as "mortal soul", "soul as subject multifamily", "soul as a social structure of instincts and unbridled emotions". So the soul, understood in this new way, can in no way be a kind of "soul-monad", it is not "I", the ego, some immediate and first certainty, behind which there is nothing else. In what we believe to be one, Nietzsche sees a multitude there we deceive ourselves with the help of the artificial term "I", which is an "appearance of unity", "an illusion in perspective"; it is the surface of the mind which creates the semblance of one, behind which lies the multiplicity, the variety of "subjects", their mutual influence and conflict. So, Nietzsche's new concept of the soul in no way means priority, inviolability of the conscious "I". The body is a better example, a better metaphor for the illustration of this new term of soul.
Also, in the methodological sense, the body is a better starting point than the soul: it is a key for what Nietzsche puts effort into, the starting point of his hypothesis, what can shed light for us on the basic term of perspectivism - the term of the will to power. Better than the soul, it gives us insight into the heterogeneousness of the subject: it is the basis of Nietzsche's ironic positioning of the will as the subject, his ironic derivation of the term will to power, beginning with the rejection of the traditional idea of subject as "the first and the immediate certainty", as the identity. It proves that the term body is the key hypothesis in the will to power, because its basic presumption is that faith in the body is stronger than faith in the spirit. Since Nietzsche no longer aims at some truth, this new term soul-body is no new locus of truth; because he has deprived himself of the right to speak any further of the truth, at this point he has "sentenced himself to invention". This way, deriving his new understanding of the reality from the "body", he ironises the modern manner according to which the "object" from the inside is the same as the "subject". A similarly ironic approach had already helped him expose the category of the subject and that of the thing as a perspectivistic illusion by seeing the "I" as a model according to which man's "genius of the species" merely imagines all other things. With an ironic delay, Nietzsche now points to another possibility. "If there is only one being, 'I', and if all other beings are modelled on it - if finally faith in 'I' stands and falls with faith in logic, i.e. in the metaphysical truth of the categories of the sense; if, on the other side, it shows itself as something which begins to exist then - " And so he ironically leads us to draw our own conclusion as to what should follow after this "then".
Nietzsches ironic setting of the will to power as a subject is based on the breaking up of the traditional term of the subject as undivided, an atom. The picture of the body is necessary in order more palpably to paint the picture of the will to power, which he sees as reality, as a subject, but in a way which can no longer be called a subject. The picture of the body is needed in order to more comprehensibly draw a picture of reality as a group of subjects which are changing, whose volume constantly increases and decreases, subjects which are transient and changeable. This gives us insight into the stable changes which prevent us from talking of an individual, because the number of beings is constantly changing; such a subject is a model for the will to power as the principle of the "subjectivity" which is at the heart of things, because the dynamic subject-points which are unsubstantial and always different for the punctuation of the will to power. This is the model for Nietzsches concept of reality, just as the traditionally understood subject was the model for the metaphysical concept of essence.
The body, which organises and gives orders to subordinate subjects (and this is exactly what the indivisibility of our subject is about) is the spitting image of the "only force which exists" and which is "by nature, exactly like the force of the will, ordering other subjects, which then change," and that is the will to power. The body is an example of giving orders which is the very essence of the will to power; it is also the example for change and existence, both of which are in the essence of Nietzsches new concept of reality, as well as of that breaking of the whole, of the unity, of the unconditional which the concept of the will to power carries with itself, as well as for the hierarchy and the battle which is an integral part of life and which emerges as obeying and ordering. The following aphorism from The Will to Power encapsulates all those consequences of Nietzsches new understanding of the body (and soul): "Why the body and physiology as the starting point? - We get a clear picture of the kind of unity of our subject, that is, as the manager at the helm of one whole community..., but also of the dependence of these managers on their subordinates and conditions for a hierarchy and division of labour which make possible the individual and the whole. We also get a clear picture of how living wholes come into existence and disappear and how eternity does not belong to the "subject"; we also understand that the battle is a part of life and that it demonstrates itself in obeying and giving orders and that a movable determination of the boundaries of power belongs to life. The relative lack of knowledge which reflects the manager in certain functions and disturbances in the society falls within the conditions in which managing is possible. In short, we also get a grade for ignorance, for observation on a large scale, and, in general, for simplifying and adulteration, for perspective... "
So the soul now appears as something on the body, as something which is not different from the body. As such, our conscience is only something superficial, the bodys toy, the last development of the organic, something without which we can think, we can want and we can remember. "A whole life would be possible, practically without seeing ourselves in a mirror, just as truly as the greater part of this life now goes on without this reflection and without that contemplative, emotional, volatile life, regardless of how insulting this may sound to an older philosopher". Only the smallest and the most superficial part of this continuous "thinking" becomes conscious. The origin of the consciousness is in communication, in the need of an animal species, in its herd instinct, in its need to make the souls of its members all alike. Consciousness itself, that is the unity of the consciousness, is nothing but deceit, just as you can name as false any unity that we are aware of, our mind, our small, geometric, conceptual mind, stretched on the nets of logic and language, is only a forgery of the great mind of the body whose work goes on under the surface of the consciousness.
Proclaiming the world a centre of individualism is merely "a senseless overestimation of the consciousness raised to the level of unity, essence; of the "spirit", the "soul", something which feels, thinks, wants - " The great mind of the body is the "great controlling force", that which controls the life of a clearly defined creation of relative duration, such as the body. Beneath the surface of our conscience are the instincts, which have been placed in hierarchy, that is where the battle of our instincts for power takes place, for more power. If we can still speak of the soul and say that a body is a social group of many souls, then one can here only talk about instincts.
And so it shows that our opinion is only apparently independent of the body, of passion; it shows in what sense "all possible affects are playing their game" behind each of our thoughts, which is why our thinking cannot free itself from the affects - because it is only a pale reflection of their battle. Thus Nietzsche ironically turns around Platos overestimation of the soul and its cognitive power compared to the body, which is in the very foundation of the entire dogmatic philosophical tradition. However, as we have seen, this is not a literal turning around; at issue here is an ironic turn, in which the very difference between the body and the spirit is being abolished. Just as, when speaking of the soul and the body, Nietzsche ironically eliminates the very difference between the subject and the object. For, according to him, the body is what, in perspectivist terms, reacts, which, all at the same time, puts up resistance and affects the whole world, the entire action and reaction game of those "subjects" which make up the whole. In this way he proves that we can no longer talk about an object, or a thing in itself, which would remain, once we realise that our concept of reality is merely an interpretation, in which the material of the senses is being adjusted, once we realise that what we call "characteristics of things are the feelings of a subject which feels". Nietzsche proves that "only a subject can be proved", he proves his hypothesis that "only subjects exist" and "that the 'object' is only the way of the subject's influence on the subject... the modus of the subject". And it proves that cognition can be referred to only in reference to the body, only in reference to their so passionate perspectives and "their interpretations and conditions of subjectivity": only if we understand cognition in this way can there be talk of some new "objectivity".
Life is the way in which the body exists, and there are as many bodies as there are kinds of life, as many bodies as there are systems of instincts, which rule in these formations of power. And just as there is life in ascent and life in descent, and two basic forms of the will to power - will to life and will to nothing, there are also healthy and ill bodies, both of which interpret the world in their own way.
As we have seen, Nietzsche has proved that the body is the condition for the soul but he has not thus set any new unconditionality, any new absolute, any new arche. He shows that the body is not only that which conditions but that it is itself conditioned by the effect of the world as a whole on it. He proves that neither the body nor the world are something real, in the sense that they are not some immovable being identical to itself, something in itself. And just as "I" is a measure by which we measure the world and the model according to which we give reality to the world, then, as we have seen, the body could also be the model for Nietzsches concept of insubstantial reality as the world of dynamic points, a model for the world of the instinctive, a world of life in which instincts fight for power. The body is an ironic metaphor for Nietzsches new concept of the subject not as something which is equal to itself, but as something which constantly increases or loses its power.
The body may also be seen as a metaphor of Nietzsches new understanding of knowledge as perspective, because he sees it as an insubstantial battlefield in which the instincts are permanently clashing and in which each of them attempts to impose its own point of view on all others as a law, interpretation is the weapon which is used in this struggle. The following aphorism illustrates the nature of this battle and of such cognition. "Our needs interpret the world for us; our instincts and their pros and cons. Each instinct is a kind of love for power, each has its own point of view which it wishes to force on all other instincts as a law." And, as such, the interpretations of the body are no general and necessary rule; on the contrary, they are a product of the accidental, and all that speaks from them is their health or their illness, their wishes, weaknesses and physiological misapprehensions, the battle of their affects, a hierarchical order in which they exist.
On the nature of Nietzsche's "truth" of the will to power
How is it then at all possible to talk about the truth? How is it possible to talk about Nietzsche's truth - about the truth of Nietzsches philosophy? Isn't Nietzsche's philosophy artistic, female? Since he has convicted himself to invention, he is, therefore, in the domain of the greatest female art - the art of illusion. For our philosopher, just like woman, cares not for the truth.
Nietzsche's perspectivism implies both a new understanding of the relationship between the true and the illusory world, and a new understanding of the truth. His "truth" of the will to power is, itself, within the domain of the perspective. From his suspicion of the illusion of each attempt at cognition, which he phrased in his note from his youth: "A philosopher caught in the networks of languages", Nietzsche does not exclude even his "best science" on the will to power as "the intelligible character of things". He has understood it as an experiment, as a hypothesis. And if we are talking about something which should be a new, this time a real, true principle of capability of being learnt in the very heart of things, freed from metaphysical mendacity, i.e. if we are talking about a hypothesis, which could mean the fact that not only are we obviously contradicting our own selves by linking two incompatible terms, but also that we are being ironic, and that we are, in this way, by twisting their meaning and by putting together the incompatible, trying to break out of the old terminologies.
The result of Nietzsches criticism of the term "true and illusory world" is the eradication of the difference between the true and the illusory world. It turns out that this empirical world of ours is, at the same time, both illusory and real because "the 'illusion' belongs to reality, it is one of the forms of its being". However, since we are able to live in it, for us it is completely true. Just as it turns out that the "true" world is a mere fiction, a nothing.
The perspectivist teaching also speaks of the world beyond us: "The world, apart from the fact that we must live in it - the world which we have not reduced down to our own being, logic, our psychological prejudices - does not exist as a world "in itself", that is basically a world of relations" under certain circumstances it has a different look from each different point, it attacks each point and each point resists it - and these collective relations are, in each case, discordant - the measure of power determines which being possesses a different measure of power: in what form, with what force, what necessity it acts or puts up resistance. - Our own case is quite interesting: we have created an understanding so we may live in the world, so we notice as much as is necessary for us in order to endure life... "
This world of relations, this world of punctuation of the will to power, perspectivist, dynamic quanta in mutual interaction: at war and in battle, which attack one another, or resist attacks, is that horrible world in which one cannot live; in order for someone to be able to live in it, this world must be twisted with the assistance of logical postulates. Its characteristics are change, becoming, multifariousness, contrariness, contradiction, war. This is the world which Nietzsche has mentioned a little earlier at one point as a reality unbearable for life. In another place he speaks of that world as of the true nature of the thing which is possible (and what kind of reality is it then if one speaks of it as though it were a possibility?): "In the right place it is quite possible that the true nature of things is so harmful to life that illusory reality is necessary in order for one to live... Such is the situation in many cases, for example in marriage". Or, in the same aphorism, but later, he says: "Even if we were to accept the true world, maybe it would have less value for us: for it is very possible that the degree of illusion becomes of greater importance because of its value for self-preservation... "
Nietzsche here leaves the possibility of the true world, but only as a possibility, only in order more strongly to emphasise his thesis of the power of the false. In this way he renders senseless each term of the true, real world, the true nature of things - and this deprivation of sense affects, in the end, his idea of reality as change, becoming, multiplicity, contrariness, contradiction, war. This "truth" of Nietzsches about the world as the will to power destroys its own self: the deepest contents of this term which speaks of the will to power as non-being-like, as insubstantial, perspectival, on the world as a false world, slips away from substantiality and from the truthfulness of the term.
Now surfaces the strange affinity between woman and the will to power. From here it shows that woman is not the boundary of the will to power, something completely different from it, but its deepest essence. It shows that woman is herself this life, which is a will to power and which is inseparable from the power of the false, from the production of the illusions which are known by the name of truth and being, in which the persuasion into life occurs. And woman is the force which snatches away the foundation of Nietzsches horrible concept of the truth. This is where the deepest irony of his "male" truth of the battle and war lies, one which only warriors can withstand.
 According to the translation by Jovica Aćin, published in: Theoria, 3-4/1982, p. 11.
. Jacques Derrida, for example, points out that it is symptomatic that, in his interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger leaves out this motif which is not of insignificant importance for Nietzsche's understanding of the truth. cf. Jacques Derrida, Spurs - Nietzsche's Styles, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1979, p. 7989.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, Grafos-Belgrade, 1993, 232, 233, 239. Or, Ecce Homo, Grafos-Belgrade, 1988, Why I Write Such Good Books, 5. Also see: Derrida, J, - Spurs, p. 65, 104.
 cf. The Gay Science, Grafos-Belgrade, 1989, Preface to the second edition, 1
 cf. Book About a Philosopher, Grafos-Belgrade, 1987, III, 2, p. 87
 cf. Ecce Homo, Why I Write Such Good Books, 5
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, Preface.8. also, 23
 ibid, 23
 ibid. Preface.
The Gay Science, Preface to the second edition, 2
Beyond Good and Evil, Preface
 ibid. 2, 34
 cf. The Birth of a Tragedy, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1983,
Beyond Good and Evil, 206
 cf. The Birth of a Tragedy,. p.96
 cf. The Gay Science - Preface to the second edition, 4; 59, 60, 64, 339, 361; Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, 84, 127, 144, 331, 232, 237, 239; Twilight of the Idols, Grafos-Belgrade, 1988 Maxims and Arrows, 13, 16, 27, 28; How the "Real World" Finally Became a Fairy Tale, 2; The Will to Power, Dereta, Beograd, 1991, 865.
Twilight of the Idols , Maxims and Arrows, 2
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 232, p. 160, 161.
 cf. Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows, 16.
 cf. The Gay Science, 339.
 cf. The Will to Power, 552, p. 342
 cf. ibid.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 2
 cf. The Will to Power, 516
Beyond Good and Evil, 36.
The Will to Power, 567.
 ibid, 568.
 cf. ibid. 584.
 cf. ibid. 586, 585 A
 cf. ibid. 585 A, 576; "Twilight of the Idols", "The mind" in philosophy, 1.
 cf. ibid. 586 V.
The Gay Science, 344.
 cf. Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 24, The Gay Science, 344.
Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 24
 cf. Derrida, J. - Spurs, 53: "...But, on the other hand, the credulous and dogmatic philosophers who believe that the truth is a woman, who believe in the truth just as they believe in the woman, know nothing. They know nothing about the truth or about the woman. For, if the woman is the truth, she at least knows that the truth does not exist, that there is no place for the truth here, just as there is no place of truth. And she is a woman because she, herself, does not believe in the truth in itself, because she does not believe in what she herself is, in what it is believed she is, in what she is not."
The Will to Power, 865
Twilight of the Idols, How the "real world" finally became a fairy tale, 1.
 cf. ibid.
 cf. Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows, 13
 cf. ibid. 28.
 cf. Derrida, J. Spurs, p. 89.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 84.
 cf. Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 12.
The Gay Science, 64.
 ibid. 361.
Beyond Good and Evil, 127.
 cf. Derrida, J. - Spurs, p. 89. Also see: Book About a Philosopher, Grafos-Belgrade, 1987, 161.
Ecce Homo, Why I Write Such Good Books, 50.
The Gay Science, Preface to the second edition, 4.
 cf. ibid. 377.
 cf. ibid. preface to the second edition, 4.
 On the relationship between the woman, truth and history, see: Derrida, J. Spurs, p. 87.
The Will to Power, 234.
Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 27
The Gay Science, 64.
Beyond Good and Evil, 259.
 cf. Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 1, 28.
Beyond Good and Evil, 259.
 cf. The Will to Power, 585 A, p. 361.
 ibid. 401
 cf. Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 24
 cf. ibid.
 cf. ibid. 585 A.
The Will to Power, 461, p. 299.
 ibid. 282.
 cf. ibid. 306, 461.
Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 17.
 ibid. III, 11.
 cf. ibid. 13.
 ibid. 13.
 ibid. 14.
 cf. ibid. 11: The Gay Science, 335.
Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 11.
 cf. ibid. GM, III, 24.
 GM, III, 12.
 ibid. 24, p. 152.
 cf. Antichrist, Grafos-Belgrade, 1988, 8.
 cf. The Gay Science, Preface, 2.
 cf. Twilight of the Idols, "The Mind" in philosophy, 1.
 cf. Zora, Moderna, Belgrade, 1989, Preface, 4.
 Concerning both this and the previous presentation of the ascetic origin of the moral of truth-loving, we can look at the example of Foucault's thesis that Nietzsche's genealogy, as research on the origin, is not metaphysics, it is not a metaphysical search for the origin as identity, as the true essence of things; Foucault here shows that something other is at issue, and not metaphysical aspirations to remove all masks and lift the veil from the original identity. This is not about knowledge, but about mocking all knowledge. cf. Foucault. M., Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Tehoria 1/1995, 2.
 cf. Stegmaier, W., Nietzsche's New Determination of the Truth, Tehoria, 3-4/1982, p. 104.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 12.
 cf. ibid. 19.
The Will to Power, 518.
 cf. ibid. 490.
 cf. ibid. 481, 491, 523, 524, 659, 660.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 36
 cf. The Will to Power, 491, 659.
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 12.
The Will to Power, 568.
 cf. ibid. 488.
 cf. ibid. 524.
 ibid. 490.
 cf. ibid. 668, 692.
 cf. ibid. 331.
 ibid. 524
 cf. Thus Spake Zarathustra, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1989, p. 67.
The Gay Science, 354.
 cf. The Will to Power, 524.
 ibid. 529.
 cf. ibid. 524, 477.
The Gay Science, 333.
 cf. The Will to Power, 562
 cf. ibid. 569.
 This is how Nietzsche sees his new "objectivity" in Towards the Genealogy of Morals III. 12.
 cf. Stegmaier, W., Nietzsches New determination of the Truth, p. 105.
 cf. Foucault. M., Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 2: "A genealogist needs history in order to remove the chimera of origin, a bit like a good philosopher needs a doctor in order to remove the shadow of the soul. - One should be able to recognize historic events, their disturbances, their surprises, stumbling victories, badly taken defeats, those events which render accounts on beginnings, on atavisms and legacies: just as one should be able to make a diagnosis for illnesses of the body, weaknesses and energy tides, their cracks and their immunities, in order to judge what a philosophical discourse is."
 cf. Grlić, D., Friedrich Nietzsche, "Naprijed", Zagreb, Nolit, Beograd, 1988, pp. 112, 113.
 Stegmaier, W., Nietzsche'sNew Determination of the Truth, p. 105.
The Will to Power, 481; Also in: Towards the Genealogy of Morals III, 12. Concerning this we can refer to Foucault's thesis according to which in Nietzsche's opinion, the body is not a new foundation of knowledge. Together with the body, Nietzsche does not set up some new unconditional, some new "in itself" which could be learnt. Nietzsche's joyful knowledge only "upsets" what "had been viewed as immovable", "breaks up into pieces what was thought to be one", "shows the heterogeneousness of what was thought to be in harmony with its own self".
 cf. Beyond Good and Evil, 24.
 ibid. 36
The Will to Power, 568.
 cf. ibid. 567
 ibid. 568.
 cf. ibid. 584.
 ibid. 583 A.
 cf. Grlić, D., Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 115.